

Returns to Alliance Portfolio Diversity: The Relative Effects of Partner Diversity on Firm's Innovative Performance and Productivity

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Where innovation starts

Introduction I

- **Alliances are ubiquitous phenomenon**
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002)
- **Increasing # of simultaneous alliances**
(De Man & Duysters, 2005; Li, Qian, & Qian, 2012)
- **Unlikely 1 alliances provides all**

- **Alliance portfolio perspective** (Wassmer, 2010)
 - **Different partners types** (e.g. Duysters and Lokshin, 2011)
 - **Incorporating (dis)synergies** (Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011; 2012)

Introduction II

- **Alliance Portfolio Diversity (APD) has been studied:**
 - Financial performance (Faems, De Visser, Andries, & Van Looy, 2010; Lavie & Miller, 2008; Mouri, Sarkar, & Frye, 2012; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2011)
 - Innovative performance (Srivastava & Gnyawali, 2011, Duysters & Lokshin, 2011; Wuyts, & Dutta, 2012)
 - Firms' exit via sell-off and shutdown (Bruyaka & Durand, 2012)
- **Only 1 performance dimension**


Firms balance strategies, maximizing exploration and exploitation (e.g., Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009; Venkatraman, Lee, & Iyer, 2007)

 - Relative performance effects?
 - Differences in optima?

Introduction III

- **Independent variable:**
 - **APD: Different types of alliance partners** (c.f. Faems, Van Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Oerlemans, Knobens, & Pretorius, 2013)
 - **Different partner types=different resources** (e.g. Aschhof & Schmidt; 2008; Belderbos, Carree, Diederens, Lokshin, & Veugelers, 2004; Teece, 1980)

- **Dependent variables:**
 - **Productivity**
 - **Radical innovative performance**
 - **Incremental innovative performance**



Theory: APD and performance

- + Supplement, complement internal innovation (RVB, e.g. Poot, Faems, & Vanhaverbeke, 2009)
 - + Combine, invest or exchange in skills, assets and knowledge, (e.g. Dyer, 1996; Nooteboom, 1999), like successive production stages
 - Budget equation (Burt, 1992)
 - Information overflow (too many, wrong time, attention) (Koput, 1997)
 - Monitoring and controlling costs (e.g., Faems, Janssens, Madhok, Van Looy, 2008; Gulati & Singh, 1998)
 - Inefficient resource allocations, opportunistic behavior (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Teece, 2002), relations specific investments and adverse selection
- ***H1/H2: APD: Inverted U-shaped, both productivity as innovative performance***

Theory: Optimum productivity

- **Combine, invest or exchange in skills, assets and knowledge, (Nooteboom, 1999; Williamson, 1985; Rosenzweig et al., 2003) like successive production stages**
- **Types of partners in the supply chain:**
 - **Supply chain management, Just In Time delivery, reductions of waste, optimalization of processes, economies of scale**
- **Reduce uncertainty:**
 - **Joint forecasting (Metters, 1997), absorbing uncertainty, share risks, provide economies of scope (Baker, 1990; Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993)**


Theory: Optimum Radical inn. perf.

- **Radical: New innovations:**
 - **Adaptation of knowledge base (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)**
 - **Concentrate limited # types of alliance partners (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2006; Riggs & Von Hippel, 1994; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998)**
 - **Attention-based theory (Simon, 1947; Ocasio, 1997)**
 - **Maximum span of control (see Simon, 1957; March, 1978)**
 - **Knowledge spillovers (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Jiang et al., 2010; Teece, 2002)**
- ***H3: For radical innovative performance the point where additional APD becomes unproductive will be higher than for productivity***

Theory: Optimum Incremental inn. perf.

- **Incremental: Improvement of existing p.p.s:**
 - Dominant design is there
 - All kinds of partners can provide resources, types are exchangeable (Garriga, von Krogh, & Spaeth, 2013; Feller, Parhankagas, & Smeds, 2007; Laursen and Salter, 2006)
 - Fine tuning: sufficient knowledge in-house, no large adaptation of knowledge base
 - Focal firm able to integrate the full range of information and resources; types of alliance partners (Pavitt, 1998)
- ***H4: For incremental innovative performance the point where additional APD becomes unproductive will be higher than for radical innovative performance***

Theory: APD and 3 perf. dimensions



Data

- **Community Innovation Surveys (CIS)**
- **The Netherlands**
- **Panel data: 1996-2006 (minus 2002 due to differences)**
- **Large, medium and small firms (~14,000 observations)**
- **26 industries**

Measurement

- **Independent variable:**
 - **APD: 7 types of alliance partners (national and foreign)**
- **Dependent variables:**
 - **Productivity: turnover per employee**
 - **Radical: % turnover new to the market**
 - **Incremental: % turnover new to firm and improved**
- **Controls: R&D intensity, Firm size, Firm AGE, APDexp, Resource constraints, Use of codified external info, MNE, Part of domestic group, basic research, performing R&D, continuous R&D, buying R&D, 26 industries and years.**

Methods

- **DV = censored (%)**
 - **Random effects, Tobit analysis**
 - **Individual effect to control for unobserved heterogeneity**
 - **Retain firms with only one observation**
 - **Retain time-invariant variables**
 - **Does not suffer from incidental-parameter problem**
 - **APD and financial: GLS**

Results

Table 2: Analyses of APD and financial, radical and incremental innovative performance

	Productivity	Radical inn.	Incremental inn.
Constant	5.71 (0.09) ***	10.12 (2.72) ***	17.24 (2.33) ***
Alliance portfolio diversity (APD)	0.46 (0.24) *	34.20 (6.06) ***	23.54 (6.75) ***
Alliance portfolio diversity Squared	-0.79 (0.38) **	-25.64 (9.11) **	-9.02 (10.36)
Tipping point	0.29	0.67	-
Number of partner types at tipping point	7.59 (0.96) ***	11.43 (1.24) ***	-
Resource constraints	-0.03 (0.03)	2.31 (0.77) **	3.69 (0.79) ***
Part of domestic group	0.14 (0.07) *	-2.08 (3.24)	1.99 (2.84)
Use of codified external information sources	-0.10 (0.05) *	1.04 (1.31) *	6.36 (1377) ***
R&D intensity	-0.10 (0.01) ***	0.06 (0.21)	0.36 (0.22)
MNE	0.09 (0.07)	-1.83 (3.23)	2.26 (2.83)
Firm size	-0.06 (0.01) ***	-1.57 (0.24) ***	-2.23 (0.24) ***
Firm age	0.00 (0.00) ***	-0.10 (0.03) ***	-0.14 (0.03) ***
APD experience	-0.04 (0.03)	0.28 (0.86)	1.40 (0.88)
Dummy: Close to basic research	0.09 (0.06)	4.44 (1.48) **	1.53 (1.59)
Dummy: R&D active	-0.03 (0.03)	3.93 (0.88) ***	2.21 (0.90) *
Dummy: Continuous R&D	0.11 (0.03) ***	6.85 (0.82) ***	7.77 (0.88) ***
Dummy: R&D outsourced	0.18 (0.03) ***	1.37 (0.69) *	0.44 (0.74)
No. observations	10685	9205	9906
No. individual firms	8461	7322	7896
No. left-censored observations	-	5065	3698
No. right-censored observations	-	74	146
σ_u	0.71 (0.02) ***	12.02 (0.67) ***	10.42 (1.04) ***
σ_e	0.84 (0.01) ***	20.62 (0.41) ***	25.57 (0.47) ***
R-square	17.84%	-	-
Log likelihood full model	-	-27347***	-31410***

† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. The models included 25 industry dummies and 5 year dummies.

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✓ H1 APD → Productivity = Inv U.


✓ H2 APD → Inn = Inv U. (partly)

✓ H3 Optima Rad > Optima Productivity

✓ H4 Optima Inc > Optima Radical

Results

Productivity, Radical and Incremental innovative performance (f) APD



Discussion and Conclusion

- **Results differ per performance dimension**
- **Different levels APD optimal for different dimensions**
- **Performance new partner, depends on previous APD: management of portfolio**
- **Multiple performance dimensions + multiple APD dimensions**

Thank you
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